Monday, December 19, 2005

Bank Fraud—Katie Gee and Michael Basilovecchio

A Pennsylvania couple has been indicted in federal court on , false statements on loan applications, and charges related to obtaining mortgages and vehicle loans.[1] Each charge carries a maximum penalty of up to $1 million in fines, 30 years in prison, or both.[2] According to the indictment, Katie Gee and her husband, Michael Basilovecchio, conducted a scheme wherein Mrs. Gee falsely represented her income on loans for the purchase of a vehicle, for the purchase of a property located in Pennsylvania, and for the refinancing of property located in Naples, Florida.[3]

All federal criminal defendants have a right to a speedy trial under the “Speedy Trial Act of 1974.”[4] This law guarantees that a defendant will be brought to trial within 70 days of the indictment being made public, or the defendant's appearance before the court, whichever date last occurs.[5] In some ways, however, this "right" is a misnomer. The government has had months, and sometimes years, to gather evidence against the defendant, while—in the normal course of events—the defendant and her attorneys only have a little under a month-and-a-half to mount a defense. So in some situations, it makes sense for the defendant to seek a continuance in order to more effectively prepare a defense. A continuance may be granted on a judge’s own motion, at the request of the defendant or her counsel, or by the Government.[6] If the judge determines that granting a continuance serves the ends of justice, a continuance may be granted.[7] The judge’s determination must be set forth in the record of the case, either orally or in writing.[8]

There are four considerations that a judge can take into account when determining whether a continuance may be granted:
  • Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in miscarriage of justice;
  • Whether the case is so unusual or complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the 70-day time limits;
  • Whether, in a case in which arrest precedes indictment, delay in the filing of the indictment is caused because the arrest occurs at a time such that it is unreasonable to expect return and filing of the indictment within 30 days, or because the facts upon which the grand jury must base its determination are unusual or complex; or
  • Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or complex as to fall within the second rubric, would nonetheless deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.[9]


[1] US Attorney’s Office, , Dec. 19, 2005.
[2] See, e.g., , , .
[3] , United States v. Gee (E.D. Pa. 2005). (PDF)
[4] et seq.
[5] Id. § 3161(c)(1).
[6] Id. § 3161(h)(8)(A).
[7] Id. § 3161(h)(8)(A).
[8] Id.
[9] Id. § 3161(8)(h)(B).